Lobbying Legislation and Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Stewart, Brenan
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
All Graduate Plan B and other Reports Graduate Studies 
12-2018 
Lobbying Legislation and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Brenan Stewart 
Utah State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports 
 Part of the Economics Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stewart, Brenan, "Lobbying Legislation and Cumulative Abnormal Returns" (2018). All Graduate Plan B and 
other Reports. 1342. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/1342 
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Plan B and 
other Reports by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 






The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (Pub.L. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735, 
enacted September 14, 2007) was passed by the U.S. Congress in order “to strengthen public 
disclosure requirements concerning lobbying activity and funding.  It placed more restrictions on 
gifts for members of Congress and their staff, and provides for mandatory disclosure of earmarks 
in expenditure bills.”  Treating this event as a natural experiment, we examine how this 
legislation affected the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of firms that lobbied in the 
year(s) leading up to the passing of the legislation.  We find that companies that lobbied in the 
years leading up to the legislation significantly underperformed the market in the days 


















1.  Introduction 
 This paper attempts to answer the question of how much value investors place on 
lobbying expenditures by companies and how “The Honest Leadership and Open Government 
Act of 2007” affected the stock returns of those companies surrounding the implementation of 
the legislation.  The null hypothesis is that the passing of this legislation would have no effect on 
the stock returns of these companies.  This legislation requires companies that lobby to increase 
public disclosure requirements surrounding lobbying activity and funding.  This would add 
increased costs to their lobbying activities and the increased disclosures could discourage certain 
types of lobbying as the activities would now be public.  The legislation also placed more 
restrictions on gifts for members of Congress and their staff.  This part of the law would make it 
more difficult to sway or bribe politicians as any gifts would face increased scrutiny.  The final 
part of the bill calls for a mandatory disclosure of earmarks in expenditure bills.  This makes it 
more difficult for legislators to provide kickbacks to these companies that had spent money 
lobbying. 
This question is important because it helps to show the types of behaviors that we 
encourage in these companies.  Finding that legislation has no effect would suggest that investors 
view these new regulations as having no consequences from a cost perspective on the 
performance of these companies.  Finding that this legislation increases the stock returns of 
companies that lobby would indicate that investors view the increased openness and scrutiny of 
lobbying positively while finding that the legislation decreased returns for these companies in the 
days leading up to and following the passing of the legislation would mean that investors view 
this bill as a negative effect for the future cash flows of these companies. 
 In order to answer this question, we examine data from the Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP) for firms that had lobbied anytime during the five year period leading up to the passing of 
the law.  We then divide these companies into three treatment groups.  The first group consists of 
companies that lobbied in 2007, the second treatment group consists of firms that lobbied 
anytime during the three years prior to 2007 (2005-2007), and the third and final treatment group 
was companies that lobbied anytime in the five years prior to 2007 (2003-2007).  The treatment 
groups are not mutually exclusive and there is a fair amount of overlap between the samples.  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the treatment groups was obtained using data from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and was accessed through Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS).   
 We examined several different event windows surrounding the passage of this legislation 
to study the CARs of these treatment groups.  The windows used were -5 to +5, -4 to +4, -3 to 
+3, -2 to +2, -1 to +1, -5 to 0, -3 to 0, -1 to 0, 0 to +3, and 0 to +5.  Day 0 designates the day the 
legislation was enacted into law, the negative and positive days represent the days before and 
after the event, respectively.  We used the CRSP value-weighted index as the market benchmark.  
The purpose in doing so is that value-weighting the benchmark provides a more accurate 
representation of the results as larger firms are those that lobby the most.  We also ran cross-
sectional regression after controlling for some other common variables showing that the actually 
lobbying amount is weakly associated with the CARs of these firms.   
 Results show that the days prior to the event had significantly negative returns across all 
treatment groups.  The days after also had negative CARs across all treatment groups, although 
weaker with a lower level of significance.  These results suggest that investors view the 
legislation as costly to those firms that lobby and subsequently bid prices down during the period 
surrounding the legislation.   
 
2. Data 
 As mentioned above, we obtain data for what firms had lobbied during these years of 
interest from the CRP.  We carefully match these firms to both CRSP and Compustat.  After the 
matching of the firms, we then divide these companies into three treatment groups.  The first 
group consists of companies that lobbied in 2007, the second treatment group consists of firms 
that lobbied anytime during the three years prior to 2007 (2005-2007), and the third and final 
treatment group consists of companies that lobbied anytime during the five years prior to 2007 
(2003-2007).  As mentioned previously, Cars are estimated using data from CRSP and the data 
was accessed through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).   
Table one gives a brief overview of the types of companies that were included in the 
treatment groups.  The control group (i.e., the benchmark) consists of all of the companies in the 
stock market.  The table shows that the three treatment groups were composed largely of similar 
companies in terms of size and share price.  As seen in the table, we include several stock-specific 
characteristics.  Each of these characteristics are obtained on the day the lobbying legislation 
passed (September 14th, 2007).  Price is the close share price.  Size is the market capitalization at 
the end of the event day.  Turnover is the percent of shares outstanding that are traded on the event 
day.  Volatility is the natural log of the intraday high price less the intraday low price.  Spread is 
the bid-ask spread, or the difference between the closing ask price and the closing bid price – 
scaled by the spread midpoint.  As seen in the table, the average stock in our first treatment sample 
has a price of $37.54, a market capitalization of $12.9 billion, share turnover of 7.77%, volatility 
of 0.5338, and a bid-ask spread of .27%. 
 
3. Results 
 In this section, we examine CARs of firms that lobbied in the years preceding the passing 
of The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007.  An abnormal return is the 
difference between the return that is expected and the actual return of a security.  CARs are the 
sum of the abnormal returns.  In this case, the abnormal returns were triggered by the event of 
congress enacting a new law.  We calculate abnormal returns in two ways.  First, the calculation 
formula for abnormal returns is as follows: 
ARit = Rit  - Rmt (1) 
where: 
ARit - abnormal return for firm i on day t 
Rit - actual return for firm i on day t 
Rm,t – return on the CRSP value-weighted index on day t 
The second way we estimate abnormal returns is by using the daily market model.  In particular, 
we estimate the following regression. 
ARit = α + βRmt + εit (2) 
Here, εit represents the portion of daily returns for stock i that is orthogonal to the market returns. 
That is, εit is the measure of abnormal returns.  In the next two tables, we present our CARs for 
the market model estimation (MM), as well as the estimation from equation (1) (MAR). For 
additional robustness, we also include CARs obtained from Scholes-Williams(1977) betas.  
These betas account for non-synchronous trading bias.  In particular, the Scholes-Williams betas 
are estimated as a function of lagged betas and leading betas.  We denote the CARs obtained 
from a Scholes-Williams model as SW.  In table 2, we see that all three treatment groups across 
all windows had significantly negative CARs at the 99% confidence level.  Treatment group 3 
had the most significance in terms of absolute T-Values while treatment group 1 had the least 
significance.  However, the results are significant across all three panels of the table.  Table 2 
presents the results for five windows.  These windows start before the day of the event and finish 
after the event.  The highest significance was found in the window from 2 days before the event 
to two days after the event.  Treatment 3 includes companies that had a longer history of 
lobbying, and the fact that there returns were more negative in terms of absolute t-values would 
lend credence to the hypothesis that investors view companies with a longer history of lobbying 
as being more negatively affected by this legislation. 
 Table 3 provides the results for six additional windows.  These windows start either 
before the event and finish on the day of the event or start on the day of the event and finish after 
the event.  They show that the CARs of these firms were significantly negative in the days 
leading up to the legislation, but show that this significance goes away after the day of the 
event.  After the event, the returns of these firms were, for the most part, negative, but not 
significantly different from zero.  These results are important since they suggest that, if anything, 




 In additional tests, we estimate a regression for the window from three days before the 
event to three days after the event with the following equation: 
CAR(-3,3)i = β1Ln(LobbyAmt+1i) + β2Ln(Pricei) + β3Ln(MktCapi) + β4Ln(Spreadi) + 
β5Ln(Turnoveri) + β6Volatility + α + εi 
 The variable of interest is Ln(LobbyAmt+1i).  With this equation, we attempt to answer 
the question of whether or not the amount of lobbying had an effect on the returns of these 
companies.  We do not find a significant association between CARs and the amount lobbied in 
treatment 1.  In treatment 2, we find a negative and significant coefficient in column [6].  These 
results suggest that MAR CARs are more negative for firms that lobbied more.  We find similar 
results in columns [8] and [9] as the coefficient on Ln(LobbyAmt+1t) is negative and significant.  
These results provide weak evidence that the negative CARs documented in earlier tables are 
driven by firms with the most lobbying.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 We conclude that firms that lobbied in the years leading up to the passing of The Honest 
Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 experienced negative CARs in the days leading 
up to the passing of the legislation leading us to believe that investors saw the money that these 
firms had spent in lobbying under the old rules as valuable and the new legislation reduced some 
of that value.  The amount of money spent lobbying mattered more to firms that had a history of 
lobbying than to firms that had only lobbied in 2007.   
 
 
Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
This table gives an overview of the characteristics of the sample.  Our sample is made up of 
firms that lobbied according to the Center for Responsive Politics, the other data came from The 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and was accessed through Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS).  We used three different samples in this study categorized into three 
treatment groups.  Treatment 1 is firms that lobbied in 2007, treatment 2 is firms that lobbied in 
during the time period from 2005-2007, and treatment 3 consists of firms that lobbied during 
the time period from 2003-2007.  All three samples had similar companies in terms of average 
price, size, turnover, and spread.  The treatment groups are not mutually exclusive and there is 
a fair amount of overlap between the samples.   
Panel A. Treatment Sample 1 
 Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Price 37.54 40.12 0.38 30.52 548.60 
Size 12878974.85 35259638.52 12664.64 2330139.58 491787052 
Turnover 7.7665 7.0261 0 5.8553 74.3262 
Volatility -0.5338 0.9527 -3.9120 -0.4943 2.3749 
Spread 0.0027 0.0052 0 0.0013 0.0665 
Panel B. Treatment Sample 2 
Price 36.59 34.91 0.38 30.59 548.60 
Size 13107539.12 35970235.90 6455.58 2344889.75 491787052 
Turnover 7.6188 7.1776 0 5.7405 74.3262 
Volatility -0.5731 0.9837 -4.6052 -0.5108 2.3749 
Spread 0.0027 0.0049 0 0.0013 0.0665 
Panel C. Treatment Sample 3 
Price 37.11 32.21 0.38 31.93 548.60 
Size 13669073.81 36767167.85 6455.58 2618219.76 491787052 
Turnover 7.5087 6.9148 0 5.7121 74.3262 
Volatility -0.5530 0.9813 -4.6052 -0.4943 2.3749 







Table 2 – Daily CARs Surrounding the passing of The Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act of 2007 
 
This table reports the CARs for various event windows surrounding the passing of the Honest 
Leadership and Open Government Act of on September 14, 2007. We report CARs for five event 
windows (-5 to +5, -4 to +4, -3 to +3, -2 to +2, and -1 to +1). Results in this table report the 
CARs obtained from market model returns, Scholes Williams returns and market adjusted 
returns. Adjusted returns are calculated as the difference between raw returns and the market 
return benchmark. The market model is also estimated with the Scholes-Williams beta 
adjustment.  This table includes results from all three treatment groups. Panel A reports the 
results for treatment 1, panel B reports the results for treatment 2, and panel 3 reports the results 
for treatment 3. All of the returns are calculated according to the CRSP value-weighted market 
index. In parenthesis, we report t-statistics. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
.10, .05, and the .01 levels, respectively.  
Panel A. CARs using the CRSP value-weighted market index TREATMENT GROUP 1 
 CAR(-5,5) CAR(-4,4) CAR(-3,3) CAR(-2,2) CAR(-1,1) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
MM -.01140 -.01240 -.00931 -.01130 -.00675 
 (-3.53)*** (-4.24)*** (-3.54)*** (-5.69)*** (-4.35)*** 
MAR -.00932 -.00942 -.00567 -.00900 -.00662 
 (-4.04)*** (-4.49)*** (-3.01)*** (-6.40)*** (-6.11)*** 
SW -.01200 -.01330 -.01040 -.01190 -.00679 
 (-5.18)*** (-6.28)*** (-5.37)*** (-8.33)*** (-6.19)*** 
Panel B. CARs using the CRSP value-weighted market index TREATMENT GROUP 2 
MM -.01190 -.01300 -.0100 -.01070 -.00609 
 (-6.20)*** (-7.57)*** (-6.69)*** (-9.25)*** (-6.69)*** 
MAR -.00982 -.01010 -.00654 -.00853 -.00594 
 (-7.14)*** (-8.17)*** (-6.06)*** (-10.33)*** (-9.29)*** 
SW -.01240 -.01360 -.01080 -.01120 -.00612 
 (-9.01)*** (-11.03)*** (-9.91)*** (-13.46)*** (-9.50)*** 
Panel C. CARs using the CRSP value-weighted market index TREATMENT GROUP 3 
MM -.01110 -.01180 -.00896 -.00977 -.00576 
 (-7.45)*** (-8.84)*** (-7.64)*** (-10.51)*** (-7.86)*** 
MAR -.00918 -.00912 -.00570 -.00774 -.00562 
 (-8.54)*** (-9.44)*** (-6.74)*** (-11.66)*** (-10.91)*** 
SW -.01140 -.01230 -.00962 -.01020 -.00577 





Table 3 – Daily CARs Surrounding the passing of The Honest Leadership and Open 
Government Act of 2007 
 
This table reports the CARs for various event windows surrounding the enaction of the Honest 
Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 into law on September 14, 2007. We report CARs 
for five event windows (-5 to 0, -3 to 0, -1 to 0, 0 to +3, and 0 to +5). Results in this table report 
the CARs obtained from market model returns, Scholes Williams returns and market adjusted 
returns. Adjusted returns are calculated as the difference between raw returns and the market 
return benchmark. The market model is also estimated with the Scholes-Williams beta 
adjustment.  This table includes results from all three treatment groups. Panel A reports the 
results for treatment 1, panel B reports the results for treatment 2, and panel 3 reports the results 
for treatment 3. All of the returns are calculated according to the CRSP value-weighted market 
index. In parenthesis, we report t-statistics. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
.10, .05, and the .01 levels, respectively. 
Panel A. CARs using the CRSP value-weighted market index TREATMENT GROUP 1 
 CAR(-5,0) CAR(-3,0) CAR(-1,0) CAR(0,1) CAR(0,3) CAR(0,5) 
MM -.00666 -.00497 -.00291 -.00171 -.00221 -.00263 
 (-3.10)*** (-2.85)*** (-2.20)** (-1.22) (-1.06) (-1.08) 
MAR -.00657 -.00341 -.00232 -.00210 -.00005 -.00055 
 (-4.36)*** (-2.81)*** (-2.51)** (-2.15)** (-0.03) (-0.31) 
SW -.00667 -.00541 -.00307 -.00160 -.00282 -.00322 
 (-4.40)*** (-4.36)*** (-3.29)*** (-1.61) (-1.88) (-1.83)* 
Panel B. CARs using the CRSP value-weighted market index TREATMENT GROUP 2 
MM -.00825 -.00648 -.00349 -.00044 -.00137 -.00148 
 (-6.25)*** (-6.29)*** (-4.51)*** (-0.54) (-1.17) (-1.05) 
MAR -.00811 -.00499 -.00292 -.00079 .00069 .00053 
 (-8.76)*** (-6.93)*** (-5.38)*** (-1.39) (0.81) (0.52) 
SW -.00826 -.00683 -.00362 -.00035 -.00186 -.00194 
 (-8.86)*** (-9.32)*** (-6.62)*** (-0.61) (-2.19)** (-1.91)* 
Panel C. CARs using the CRSP value-weighted market index TREATMENT GROUP 3 
MM -.00817 -.00611 -.00321 -.00022 -.00052 -.00061 
 (-7.77)*** (-7.51)*** (-5.28)*** (-0.33) (-0.55) (-0.56) 
MAR -.00804 -.00471 -.00267 -.00054 .00141 .00127 
 (-10.88)*** (-8.29)*** (-6.29)*** (-1.17) (2.09)** (1.61) 
SW -.00814 -.00639 -.00331 -.00013 -.00091 -.00097 
 (-10.94)*** (-11.07)*** (-7.71)*** (-0.27) (-1.35) (-1.24) 
 
 
Table 4 – Cross-Sectional Regression Results  
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation using cross-sectional data. 
CAR(-3,3)i = β1Ln(LobbyAmt+1i) + β2Ln(Pricei) + β3Ln(MktCapi) + β4Ln(Spreadi) + β5Ln(Turnoveri) + β6Volatility + α + εi 
The dependent variable is the CAR from (-3,3), where day 0 is the day the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 was signed into law. We report 
regression results when we include each of the three estimated CARs using market models, Scholes-Williams market models, and market-adjusted returns. The 
independent variable of interest is the natural log of the lobby amount (Ln(LobbyAmt+1)). The control variables include the natural log of share price 
(Ln(Price)), the natural log of market capitalization (Ln(MktCap)), the natural log of closing bid-ask spreads (Ln(Spread)), the natural log of share turnover 
(Ln(Turnover)), and volatility. We report t-statistics in parentheses, which are obtained from White (1980) robust standard errors. *,**, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the .10, .05, and the .01 levels, respectively. 
  Car(-3,3) 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
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Adjusted R2  0.0633 0.0534 0.1215 0.0740 0.0621 0.1463 0.0731 0.0583 0.1527 
N  436 436 436 1235 1235 1235 1905 1905 1905 
 
